Saint Louis University Public Law Review
Volume 24
Number 2 I Buy Therefore I Am: Consequences
of the Consumer Lending Revolution (Volume
XXIV, No. 2)

Article 11

2005

Avoiding the Need to “Unscramble the Egg:” A Proposal for the
Automatic Stay of Subsequent Adoption Proceedings When
Parents Appeal a Judgment Terminating Their Parental Rights
Kate M. Heideman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Heideman, Kate M. (2005) "Avoiding the Need to “Unscramble the Egg:” A Proposal for the Automatic Stay
of Subsequent Adoption Proceedings When Parents Appeal a Judgment Terminating Their Parental
Rights," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 24 : No. 2 , Article 11.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AVOIDING THE NEED TO “UNSCRAMBLE THE EGG:” A
PROPOSAL FOR THE AUTOMATIC STAY OF SUBSEQUENT
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS WHEN PARENTS APPEAL A
JUDGMENT TERMINATING THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS

I. HYPOTHETICAL1
Imagine that your client, Jane Doe, comes to you and explains that she is in
desperate need of your help. As you calmly tell her to explain the facts of her
problem, Ms. Doe begins by explaining that almost two and a half years ago,
her two children, A and B, were taken into foster care by State X after she was
accused of neglecting them. Although Ms. Doe complied with the goals set by
the court for reunification, Judge Y terminated her parental rights after fifteen
months. She then filed a timely appeal with the appellate court in State X and
went through the necessary steps to appeal the judgment. Each side filed many
extensions, and the appeal took another fifteen months.
Ms. Doe explains that the appellate court determined that Judge Y was
incorrect in terminating Ms. Doe’s parental rights. However, the court also
explained that it recently came to their attention that thirty days after the
judgment terminating Ms. Doe’s parental rights, but after Ms. Doe filed her
appeal, Ms. Doe’s two children were adopted by their foster parents. Although
Ms. Doe had no knowledge of the subsequent adoption, the appellate court
explained that Ms. Doe’s appeal of the judgment terminating her parental
rights did not automatically stay the subsequent adoption proceedings under
State X’s adoption statute. The court further explained that, because Ms.
Doe’s children had been adopted for over a year, there was nothing that Ms.
Doe, nor the court, could do to overturn the adoption. Ms. Doe, obviously
extremely upset by this turn of events, has come to you asking whether there is
anything you can legally do to help get her children back.
Upon researching, you realize with a sinking feeling that the court of
appeals was correct in their analysis of State X’s laws and that appealing the
judgment to the Supreme Court of State X could ultimately be fruitless. You
then set out on a path to determine whether State X’s law is constitutionally
sound, and whether there is any possibility of gaining a remedy for Ms. Doe.

1. Hypothetical is based roughly on the case of In re Tekela. See generally In re Tekela,
780 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. 2002).
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II. INTRODUCTION
In November of 1997, President William J. Clinton signed the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)2 into law.3 With one swift movement
of his pen, President Clinton modified the then existing Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 19804, which primarily promoted reasonable efforts
to reunify the child and the biological parents.5 The ASFA redefined the
standard of reasonable efforts, and simultaneously promoted the idea that if
reasonable efforts did not succeed to reunite the family within fifteen months,
termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest.6
To implement the ideas of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, states have
modified their statutes to set guidelines for judges terminating parental rights
in compliance with the ASFA.7 Each statute allows the government to utilize
their police and parens patrae8 powers to remove children from their parent’s
custody in order to protect those children incapable of helping themselves, to
promote public welfare and to prevent harm.9 Simultaneously, each state has
taken strides to ensure that children do not lose precious time lacking
continuity and stability in the foster care system and are instead placed in safe
and stable homes by giving judges guidelines and a timeline for terminating
parental rights.10
Although such efforts to find safe and stable homes for children should be
commended, in recent years three supreme court decisions in separate states
revealed a disturbing problem.11 These cases raise the question of whether
2. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3. Id.
4. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5. See id.
6. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
7. Steve Christian, National Conference of State Legislatures, 1998 Legislative Responses
to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 24 STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT (1999), at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/asfaslr.htm.
8. Traditionally, the parens patrae power refers to the role of state as a sovereign, and gives
the government standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen incapable of prosecuting on
their own. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
9. Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the States Burden under
Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 BU. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 264 (2003). For background
information on state legislatures’ responses to ASFA, see Christian, supra note 7.
10. See Christian, supra note 7.
11. The three cases are: 1) In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 312-313 (holding that, although clear
and convincing evidence of unfitness did not exist to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the
termination of Mother’s parental rights must be upheld due to the subsequent adoption of
Mother’s children during her appeal), 2) In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 226 (Mich. 2003) (holding
that the adoption of Mother’s children, which took place during her appeal, was invalid under
Michigan law, which provided for the automatic stay of adoption proceedings during appeal), and
3) State ex rel. T.W. v. Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d 41, 43 (Mo. 2004) (holding that it is an abuse of
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states have shifted too far in their push to quickly move children into
permanent homes at the expense of a parent’s right to appeal such judgments.
In each case, the trial court decided to commence adoption proceedings, and at
times even finalize such adoptions, while the parents pursued their right to
appeal the termination judgments underlying, and necessary to, such
adoptions.12
This Comment analyzes this startling problem and proposes a statutory
solution. It does not suggest that states should not terminate the rights of unfit
parents when termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.
Nor does this Comment suggest that adoption is not in the best interest of the
child after a legal termination has occurred. Instead, this Comment suggests
that states have swung too far in their attempt to comply with the ASFA,
trampling on the rights of parents to appeal any judgment made against them.
By failing to provide for automatic stays when parents appeal a wrongful
judgment terminating their parental rights and instead finalizing adoptions
before a decision on the appeal is rendered, states have effectively taken away
the right to appeal.
Section III of this Comment examines the historical background of today’s
state statutes, focusing primarily on the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 and state responses to the ASFA legislation. Section IV analyzes recent
case law, which reveals a problem regarding subsequent adoptions following
the appeal from judgments terminating parental rights. Section V contains the
author’s analysis of the problem, focusing on both constitutional and policy
concerns. Section V proposes a model statute, which provides for automatic
stays of any ongoing or subsequent adoption proceedings upon notice of a
timely appeal of the underlying judgment terminating parental rights. In
addition, this proposal provides for an expedited appellate process in order to
prevent children from languishing in the foster care system and to comply with
the mandates set forth in the ASFA. Section V also analyzes how this proposal
satisfies constitutional due process concerns as well as public policy concerns
that arise when states fail to stay adoption proceedings upon appeal.
discretion for a circuit court to proceed with an adoption of children who were the subject of a
termination of parental rights while an appeal of the termination is pending). See also In the
Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that although the
termination of parental rights was affirmed, the subsequent adoption that took place during the
appeal should be reversed under the Florida statute providing for automatic stays pending appeal);
In the Interest of Baby Boy N, 874 P.2d 680, 690-91 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to enter an order of adoption, as operation of the order terminating
the father’s parental rights was suspended as soon as the father filed notice of appeal of the
termination order); Jean Ann Kobinski v. The State of Nevada Welfare Division, 738 P.2d 895,
897-98 (Nev. 1987) (stating as dictum concern with Nevada’s procedure of finalizing an adoption
pending appeal, but upholding the subsequent adoption due to their affirmance of the underlying
termination).
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

448

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:445

III. BACKGROUND
A.

The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997

Beginning in 1980, states received guidance in structuring their individual
foster care and adoption statutes from the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980.13 However, significant problems in implementing the
ambiguous mandate for “reasonable efforts” and a strong policy for
reunification14 led to a disturbing rise in the number of children coming into,
and either remaining in, or returning to the foster care system.15 As a result,
more children were entering foster care than were exiting into safe, permanent
and stable placements.16 In 1997, there were over five hundred thousand
children nationwide in the foster case system,17 and the number was rapidly
increasing.18 In response to increased concern over nation-wide trends,19 the

13. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
14. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act mandated that in order to remain
eligible for federal funding, “reasonable efforts will be made prior to the placement of a child in
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home and to make it
possible for the child to return to his home.” Id. at § 101.
15. Cristine H. Kim, Comment, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 292 (1999) (explaining that
states were placing great emphasis on goals of family preservation and reunification, which
caused children to “languish[] in foster care” and “remain[] in limbo as to their permanency”).
See also 143 Cong. Rec. S12,669 (1997) (testimony of Sen. Dewine) (stating that “[t]here can be
no doubt that this problem did, in fact, arise because of the 1980 law, and it arose because this
1980 law was and has been for 17 years misinterpreted”).
16. United States General Accounting Office report to the Chairmen, Subcommittee on
Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Juvenile Courts:
Reforms Aim to Better serve Maltreated Children at 8 (1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99013.pdf. This phenomenon is known as a “foster care
drift,” where children languish in the foster care system “because permanent goals were not
established, maintained and carried out.” Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (E.D. La.
1991). See also Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium, The Promise and Failure of
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 643 (1999) (explaining that
“[m]any of these children [in foster care] lacked any prospect of going to a permanent home any
time soon, and were instead ‘drifting’ among multiple homes for long periods of time”).
17. Foster care is defined as:
24-hour substitute care for children placed away from their parents or guardians and for
whom the State agency has placement and care responsibility. This includes, but is not
limited to, placements in foster family homes, foster homes of relatives, group homes,
emergency shelters, residential facilities, child care institutions, and preadoptive homes.
45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2004).
18. Christian, supra note 7 (reporting that at the end of 1985, the number of children in
foster care totaled 270,000 while by the end of 1996, the total was approximately 502,000).
19. In addition to the concern over the number of children currently stagnant in the foster
care system, legislators were also concerned with incidences of murder among children returned
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One Hundred and Fifth Congress passed, and on November 19, 1997,
President Clinton signed, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)
into federal law.20
The ASFA is widely accepted as one of the most significant pieces of
federal child welfare legislation in United States history.21 The purpose of the
ASFA is primarily to promote the adoption of children who are currently in
foster care.22 In order to fulfill this goal, the ASFA provides states with
procedural guidance, which was previously lacking under the Child Welfare
Act of 1980.23
First, the ASFA provides states with guidance in determining reasonable
efforts and safety requirements for foster care and adoption.24 Unless the
family situation falls within a few clearly defined exceptions,25 the ASFA
requires that states make reasonable efforts for twelve months to reunify and
preserve the family unit and make it possible for the child to return home.26
Although the ASFA does not define reasonable efforts, it does provide that “in
determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to the child, as
described in this paragraph, and in making such reasonable efforts, the child’s
health and safety shall be the paramount concern.”27
Secondly, the ASFA sets a timetable explaining when states should begin
termination proceedings after a child has been in foster care and the state has
to their biological parents, the detrimental effect that allowing for eighteen months to attempt
reunification has on the waiting child, the number of time extensions allowed by states, and
permanent plans which allowed children to remain in unstable long-term foster placements.
ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CHILD RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 314 (Diana G. Collier ed. 2002).
20. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. Christian, supra note 7. With the enactment of the ASFA legislation, each state was
required to enact numerous extensive changes to their state laws and policies in order to remain
eligible for funds previously more easily available under the Social Security Act. Id.
22. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101. See also Katherine A. Hort,
Comment, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child? ASFA’s Guidelines for
the Termination of Parental Rights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879, 1894-95 (2001).
23. Compare Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) with Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
24. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101(a)(15); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000).
25. Reasonable efforts are not required if the parent has 1) subjected the child to “aggravated
circumstances” including abandonment, torture, chronic abuse and sexual abuse, 2) committed,
aided and abetted, attempted, conspired or solicited to commit murder or manslaughter of another
child, committed felony assault that results in serious bodily injury of another child, or 3) the
parental rights to another child have been involuntarily terminated. Id. at § 101(a)(15)(D); 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D).
26. Id. at § 101(a)(15)(B)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii). This is a change from the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, which required states to make reasonable
efforts towards reunification for at least eighteen months. FELLMETH, supra note 19, at 314.
27. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101(a)(15)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A).
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made reasonable efforts toward reunification.28 In setting the guidelines, many
different versions of a timeline were introduced.29 One timeline proposed that
states should be required to initiate termination proceedings after a child had
been in care 18 of the last 24 months.30 Another plan proposed that the
timetable should be hastened, requiring termination proceedings after the child
had been in care only 12 of the last 18 months.31 Ultimately, the ASFA offered
a compromise, providing that if a child has been in foster care for 15 of the
most recent 22 months the state is required to file a petition to begin
termination proceedings and “concurrently to identify, recruit, process, and
approve a qualified family for adoption.”32
Finally, in addition to providing both guidance to the states in their
reasonable effort requirements, and a timeline for termination proceedings, the
ASFA provided for monetary “adoption incentive payments” to states for each
foster child adopted over and above a “base number”33 in a given year.34
Under ASFA guidelines, each state would receive four thousand dollars for

28. Id. at § 101(a)(3)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
29. Compare Adoption Promotion Act of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. § 3 (a)(3)(E) (1997)
and Promotion of Adoption, Safety, and Support for Abused and Neglected Children (PASS) Act,
H.R. 867, 105th Cong. §104(a)(3)(E) (1997) with Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, H.R.
867, 105th Cong. § 103(a)(3)(E) (1997) (enacted).
30. Adoption Promotion Act of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(E). See also 143
Cong. Rec. H. 2016 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement by Rep. Shaw) (describing the Adoption
Promotion Act of 1997 as “require[ing] States to move to terminate parental rights parental rights
and find an adoptive family if children under 10 have been in foster care for 18 of the past 24
months”).
31. See Promotion of Adoption, Safety, and Support for Abused and Neglected Children
(PASS) Act, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. §104(a)(3)(e). See also 143 Cong. Rec. H. 2027 (statement
of Rep. Tiahrt) (describing the PASS Act as “reduc[ing] a timeframe for the State to seek to
terminate parental rights from 18 to 12 months”).
32. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 103(a)(3)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). Note
that the state does not have to file the petition to terminate parental rights if the child is being
cared for by a relative or if the state has not provided the services necessary for the safe return of
the child to the child’s home. Id. § 103(a)(3)(E)(i)-(iii), § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii).
33. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 §
201(g)(3)(A)-(B) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). In the original legislation, the base
number for fiscal year 1998 was the average number of foster child adoptions in fiscal years
1995, 1996, and 1997. Id. The base number for subsequent fiscal years was the number of foster
child adoptions in the fiscal year with the greatest number of foster care adoptions since 1997. Id.
The current version of the legislation sets the base number fiscal year 2003 at the number of
foster child adoptions in fiscal year 2002. Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 § 4(c)(5)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 673b(g)(3)(A) (2000). For subsequent years, the base number is the number of foster
child adoptions in the fiscal year with the greatest number of foster care adoptions since 2002. Id.
at § 4(c)(5)(B), § 673b(g)(3)(B).
34. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 201(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1) (providing
the amounts of adoption incentive payments due for a fiscal year to a State).
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every adoption completed over the base number as well as an additional two
thousand dollars for every child adopted with “special needs.”35
Many bipartisan groups supported the ASFA,36 and the ultimate goal of the
legislation seemed to be standard across all arenas: “to ensure that abused,
neglected children are in safe settings and to move children more rapidly out of
the foster care system.”37 Although the ASFA provides clear guidelines for
states in terminating parental rights, the legislation provides no procedural
guidance to states in circumstances where the system breaks down and parental
rights are wrongfully or prematurely terminated.38 Although the ASFA
provides an overall goal of promoting adoption and diminishing the number of
children “languishing” in the foster care system, the ASFA does not provide
guidance for states in how to proceed during an appellate process.39
Although a few legislators testifying at the legislative hearings discussed
maintaining a parent’s right to appeal,40 the great majority of legislators mainly
focused on pinpointing a way to proceed quickly and more efficiently to
permanency and adoption for children in foster care.41 An overwhelming
number of those who testified at the legislative hearings made no mention of
preserving the right to appeal, but focused instead on the intention that the
ASFA would prompt states to enact their own legislation in compliance with

35. Id. Because the original legislation did not allow adoption incentive payments after
fiscal year 2003, President George W. Bush expanded the availability of the adoption incentive
payments until fiscal year 2008. Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 § 3(a)(2)(B), (C). See also 42
U.S.C. § 673b(b)(5). In addition, the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 furnished additional
payments of four thousand dollars for foster care adoptions of children over nine years old, which
were classified as “older child adoptions.” Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 § 3(a)(3)(C). See
also 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1)(C).
36. Hort, supra note 22, at 1894 (stating that the act “had tremendous bipartisan support”
and explaining that organizations such as the Heritage Foundation and Child Defense Fund
endorsed the legislation).
37. Child Welfare Revisions: Hearing of the Social Security and Family Policy Subcomm. of
the Senate Finance Comm. 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Child Welfare Revisions] (statement
of Sen. John Chafee). See also 143 Cong. Rec. S12671 (1997) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller);
United States General Accounting Office report to the Chairmen, Subcommittee on Human
Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Juvenile Courts: Reforms
Aim to Better serve Maltreated Children at 8 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1999/he99013.pdf.
38. See generally Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
39. See id.
40. Hearing upon the Promotion of Adoption Safety and Support for Abused and Neglected
Children (PASS) Act Before the Senate Finance Comm. 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Mary L. Landrieu) (stating that the legislators should not inhibit parents from
exhausting their legal rights).
41. Id; 143 Cong. Rec. S12671 (1997) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller); Child Welfare
Revisions, supra note 37.
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the federal mandates to allow for faster termination proceedings, and a greater
number of adoptions.42
B.

State Statutory Action Following the ASFA

Largely, the ASFA legislation left a great deal of discretion to the states in
determining which changes should be made to their state legislation to ensure
compliance with the ASFA.43 With incentives provided by the federal
government,44 today each state has enacted legislation to conform to the
requirements of the ASFA.45 The great majority of state statutes now provide
for initiating termination proceedings when a child has been in state care for 15
of the last 22 months, as provided by the ASFA.46 In addition, each state
statute lays out further provisions which judges use as guidelines to determine
when the state has provided “reasonable efforts” for reunification, and when
grounds exist to justify terminating a parent’s rights.47 Although all states have

42. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 40; 143 Cong. Rec. S12671 (1997) (statement of Sen.
Rockefeller); Child Welfare Revisions, supra note 37 (testimony of Rep. Camp).
43. Christian, supra note 7.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1) (describing the incentive payments “payable to a State”).
45. Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First Three Years
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 25, 32 (2001). The
National Conference on State Legislatures has published a searchable database of all states’
implementing legislation. National Conference on State Legislatures, Summaries of State
Legislation Enacted in Response to the Adoption and Safe Families Act, at http://www.ncsl.org/
statefed/cf/asfasearch.htm (updated 2001).
46. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088(d)(1) (Michie 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3604(2)(k) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623(i) (Michie 2004); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/2-13(4.5)(a)(i) (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. §31-35-2-4.5(2)(B) (West 2005); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.111(2)(a)(1) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4052(2A)(A) (West 2004);
MD. CODE ANN., [FAM. LAW] § 5-525.1(b)(1)(i) (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
26(4)(iii) (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(1) (2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6351(f)(9) (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1(e)(6) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7768(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5b(a)(1) (Michie 2004); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 48.417(1)(a) (West 2004). But see, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7b-907(d) (2005) (providing
for a termination petition to be filed after a child has been in care 12 out of the most recent 22
months); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b)(2) (2003) (providing for a termination petition to be
filed after a child has been in care for 450 out of 660 nights); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.413(D) (West 2004) (providing for a termination petition to be filed after a child has been in
care for 12 of the most recent 22 months).
47. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (Michie 2004); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie
2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-846 (West
2004); ARK CODE. ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West
2004); FL. STAT. ANN. § 39.701 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE § 16-1615 (Michie 2004); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-13.1 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-21-5.6 (West 2005); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4041 (West
2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (West
2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.183 (West 2004); MO. ANN.
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adopted provisions in compliance with the federal law, many variations exist in
the exact provisions states have chosen.48
Similarly, just as states have enacted different statutes regarding the
termination of parental rights, states have responded to the lack of direction
given in the ASFA by taking vastly different statutory stances on the effect of
appealing a judgment wrongfully terminating parental rights. Although a
judgment terminating parental rights is considered a “final judgment,” which
allows dissatisfied parties to appeal, each state has a different interpretation of
whether such an appeal should stay the underlying judgment and any
subsequent adoption proceedings until a decision is rendered. A minority of
states specifically provide for automatic stays of the underlying termination
judgment and subsequent adoptions upon notice of an appeal.49 Other states
STAT. § 211.447 (West 2004); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 41-3-423 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292
(2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-507 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS
15-7-7 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-768 (Law. Co-op. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-763
(Law Co-op. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (Law Co-op. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1166 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-313.5 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-311 (2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-203 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-203.5 (2004); VA. CODE.
ANN. § 16.1-283 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.190 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 49-6-3b (Michie 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5b (Michie 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
14-2-309 (Michie 2004).
48. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (Michie. 2004); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie.
2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-846 (West
2004); ARK CODE. ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West
2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129 (WEST 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.701 (West 2004);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1615 (Michie 2004); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623 (Michie 2001); 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 405/2-13 (West 2004); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2-13.1 (West 2004); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-35-2-4.5 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-21-5.6 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 232.111 (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4041 (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (West 2004); MD. CODE
ANN., [FAM. LAW] § 5-525.1 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 26 (West 2005); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (2004); MO. ANN. REV.
STAT. § 232.111 (West 2004); MO. ANN. REV. STAT. § 211.183 (West 2004); MO. ANN. REV.
STAT. § 211.447 (West 2004); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 41-3-423 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292
(2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7b-507 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7b-907 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §
27-20-44 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.413 (West 2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6351 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1 (2004); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-768 (Law. Co-op. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-763 (Law. Co-op. 2004);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (Law. Co-op. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-166 (2004); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-313.5 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-311 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §
62A-4a-203 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-203.5 (2004); VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-283
(Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.190 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-3b
(Michie 2004); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5b (Michie 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415 (West 2004);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.417 (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (Michie 2004).
49. E..g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §366.26(b)(1) (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
9.146(c)(2) (West 2005); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-2407 (2003); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.56(2)(c) (West 2004).
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allow for the stay of the termination judgment and subsequent adoptions, but
only upon a motion made to the trial court that entered the judgment, and at
times, upon issuance of a bond.50 Moreover, some states fail to specifically
discuss the effect that an appeal will have on a judgment terminating parental
rights, and because of this oversight, the judiciary is forced to piece together an
answer based on the effect of appeals in other areas of the law.51
IV. RECENT CASES REVEAL A DISTURBING PROBLEM
Recently, case law from the supreme courts of Illinois, Michigan and
Missouri have revealed a problem that stems from the wide variety of
procedural guidelines that states have enacted to deal with the effect of
appealing the judgment terminating parental rights on adoption proceedings
and the underlying judgment.52 In each of the following cases, the courts
examined their state’s controlling statute and decided whether the trial court
was correct in allowing the child to be adopted after a timely appeal was
initiated or if the trial court should have instead suspended or stayed the
proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal.53
A.

In re Tekela54

In August of 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court faced a situation in In re
Tekela, where a mother’s rights were terminated and, pending appeal, her two
children were adopted.55 In March of 1993, two of Wanda Cooper’s
(“Mother’s”) three children, Ira and Tekela, were placed in foster care by the
State of Illinois after allegations of abuse.56 Over four years later, in August of
1997, the State of Illinois petitioned the circuit court to terminate Mother’s
parental rights, alleging that Mother suffered from a mental illness and would
be unable to discharge her parental responsibilities.57

50. E.g., ARIZ. STAT. JUV. CT. P. R. 88; IDAHO CODE §16-1617 (Michie 2004); LA.
CHILDRENS CODE. art. 336(A) (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §170-C:15 (2004).
51. Compare MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.011 (West 2004) with State ex rel. T.W. v.
Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 2004).
52. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 304; In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216; State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d
41.
53. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 304; In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216; State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d
41.
54. 780 N.E.2d 304.
55. Id. at 305.
56. Id. at 306.
57. Id. Simultaneously, the State petitioned the court to appoint the Division of Child and
Family Services as guardian of the children with the power to consent to an adoption of mother’s
three children. Id.
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In December of 1998, the State filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
which Mother promptly objected to in writing.58 On April 3, 1999, the court
granted the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment, terminating Mother’s
parental rights and concurrently appointing a guardian for both Ira and Tekela,
who could consent to their adoption.59 One month later, on May 7, 1999,
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, consistent with requirements set forth
by Illinois statute, arguing that issues of material fact existed at the time the
judgment was made, making summary judgment improper.60
In February of 2001, the appellate court reversed the decision of the circuit
court, stating summary judgment and “[t]ermination of parental rights [are]
drastic measure[s] and, accordingly, the facts must be reviewed with close
scrutiny.”61 The appellate court stated there were unresolved questions of
material fact regarding whether Mother’s mental illness left her unable to
discharge her parental responsibilities.62 Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment.63
Approximately a week after the appellate court issued its judgment, the
public guardian assigned to the case by the circuit court filed a motion to
vacate the appellate court’s decision and informed the appellate court for the
first time that both Ira and Tekela had been adopted by their foster parents in
September of 1999.64 The adoption took place four months after Mother filed
her notice of appeal.65 The appellate court denied the guardian’s motion to
vacate, expressing doubt about whether the adoption was legally valid in light
of the appellate courts decision to reverse the termination order.66 The Illinois
Supreme Court expressly stated, “neither the State nor the public guardian
challenge the substance of the appellate court’s February 20, 2001, ruling that
58. Id.
59. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d, at 306. The circuit court simultaneously terminated the
parental rights of Father; however, Father did not appeal the judgment and therefore is not
involved in the present appeal. Id.
60. Id. In her appeal, Mother raised a constitutional question of whether the use of summary
judgment to terminate parental rights violates due process; however the court explained that
answering the constitutional question was not necessary in deciding the case. People v. Cooper
(In re T.J.), 745 NE.2d 608, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
61. Id. at 616.
62. Id. at 617-18 (stating that “the question of whether a parent has a mental illness or
impairment that prevents her from discharging her parental duties, unlike the question of whether
a parent has a conviction for a particular crime, is a nuanced, fact-intensive question that does not
readily lend itself to summary determination”).
63. Id. at 618 (explaining that before terminating mother’s parental rights, the court should
have examined how mother would function as a parent with medication and therapy, and a
psychological assessment should have been obtained to examine how mother performed her
parental responsibilities).
64. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 306.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 307.
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summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.”67 Instead, the State argued
that, although Mother’s rights should not have been terminated through the
summary judgment proceeding, the decision by the appellate court was moot
because Mother’s children had already been adopted for over a year at the time
of the appellate court’s decision.68
Under then current Illinois statutes, in order to effectively preclude the
lower court from finalizing an adoption while the appeal was pending, Mother
should have filed a motion to stay the underlying judgment when she appealed
the underlying judgment terminating her parental rights.69 Although the court
acknowledged that statutes in other states provided for automatic stays when
an order terminating parental rights is appealed,70 in Illinois the stay was not an
automatic occurrence.71 In addition, under Illinois law, once a child has been
adopted for a term of one year, the adoption is final and unappealable.72
Although this statutory scheme provided children with permanent placements,
it also left parents without a remedy if their rights had been erroneously
terminated.73
In reversing the order of the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court
explained that they were bound by then current Illinois law, which required the
parent to request a stay to “protect that right [to appeal] and to take necessary
steps to preserve the fruits of [that parent’s] appeal.”74 However, the court also
acknowledged that a stay is necessary to preserve the status quo pending
appeal due to the short period of time that normally elapses between the entry
of an order terminating parental rights and the subsequent adoption enforcing

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 308 (stating that “[a] notice of appeal is not an application of
stay within the meaning of this court’s rules”).
70. The court expressly referenced Florida’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provided
for the automatic stay of any subsequent adoption during the appeal of the termination of parental
rights. Id. at 308 n.1. See generally FLA. R. APP. P. § 9.146.
71. See In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 308 (stating that “in this case, Wanda failed to request a
stay . . .”) (emphasis in original). The current version of the Illinois Supreme Court Rule has
changed, allowing for the automatic stay of the termination of parental rights upon notice of an
appeal, and prohibits “entry of an order of adoption without the parent’s consent or surrender, and
shall also operate to stay the termination order with respect to any power granted to a person or
agency to consent to an adoption.” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305(e)(2).
72. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 310.
73. See id. at 311 (explaining that “[w]hile our constitution guarantees a right to meaningful
appellate review, it does not necessarily guarantee relief on the merits or relief that will be
acceptable to the appellant”). “No procedural principal is more familiar . . . than that a
constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make
timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” Id. at 308
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 751 (1991)).
74. Id. at 308.
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that order.75 Although the court expressed concern and frustration with the
situation at hand, the court was compelled by Illinois law to reinstate the
termination order due to the subsequent adoption that occurred during the
appeal.76
In a strong dissent, Chief Justice Harrison noted that Mother had a
fundamental right to appeal the judgment entered against her under Illinois
law.77 Justice Harrison noted that the State of Illinois provided that “[a]
condition precedent to an adoption is either consent of the parent or a finding
by the court that consent is not required for the reason of unfitness.”78 Justice
Harrison argued that, because the court of appeals found that Mother’s parental
rights were not legally terminated, and Mother did not consent to the adoption,
Ira and Tekela were not eligible for adoption.79 He further explained that the
failure to request a stay from the trial court should not preclude Mother from
appealing nor leave her without a remedy.80
Overall, both sides expressed frustration regarding the statutory system
they were required to follow.81 While still advocating for permanency and
stability for the children the state is trying to protect, both the majority and the
dissent strongly expressed a need for a change in Illinois law to prevent a
similar situation from occurring in the future.82 In response, the Illinois
legislature amended their rule regarding appeals and now provides for
automatic stays of subsequent adoption proceedings upon notice of an appeal
from the judgment terminating parental rights.83
B.

In re J.K.84

In 2003, the Michigan Supreme Court faced a situation similar to that seen
only one year before in Illinois.85 In 1999, the State of Michigan took

75. Id. The court explained later in the opinion that an adoption is normally completed
between three months and a year after the termination of parental rights. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d
at 312.
76. Id. at 312-13 (noting that “structured reforms are obviously necessary” in this area).
77. Id. at 313 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 314 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
79. Id. While Chief Justice Harrison acknowledged the need for finality and stability in the
adoption process he noted that “finality and stability cannot excuse the failure to effectuate an
adoption that complies with the law.” In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 315 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 314 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
81. See generally id. at 311-12 (stating that the court is dealing with critical issues of
children and families and expressing a need for “structured reform”); id. at 315 (Harrison, J.,
dissenting)(stating that by allowing the adoption to take place “the majority has embarked on a
dangerous course” as “once the adoption decree is entered, the natural parents will be left with no
recourse”).
82. See id. at 312-16.
83. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305(e).
84. 661 N.W.2d 216 (Mich. 2003).
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jurisdiction over sixteen month old JK after respondent (“Mother”) admitted to
using marijuana.86 Mother complied with all of the goals set by the court by
entering into substance abuse counseling, participating in an assistive living
program, retaining employment, securing housing, caring for herself, visiting
with her child and attending to her child’s needs.87 However, despite these
efforts, the State petitioned for termination of Mother’s parental rights, citing
as its only basis for termination a lack of attachment and bonding with the
child, which was disputed by psychiatrists.88
Mother first appealed the decision terminating her parental rights to the
court of appeals, who affirmed the judgment.89 Mother then filed a timely
application to appeal the judgment to the Michigan Supreme Court, and filed a
copy of the application to appeal with the trial court.90 However, before the
court ruled on the application, and before a hearing date was scheduled, the
trial court entered an order finalizing the adoption of Mother’s child by the
current foster parents.91
Under Michigan law, when an appeal from the judgment terminating
parental rights is filed, the Michigan Adoption Code prohibits a trial court from
entering an order of adoption until the court of appeals affirms the
termination.92 The county in this case admitted they did not comply with the
adoption code, but instead designated the subsequent adoption as “at risk” of
being overturned by the appellate court.93
Ultimately, the court held there was not clear and convincing evidence that
Mother’s parental rights should have been terminated,94 and found it disturbing
that the trial court proceeded with the adoption pending the appeal in the
supreme court.95 The court explained that in doing so, the trial court ignored

85. See generally id. The Michigan court analyzed the situation under the Michigan
Adoption Code. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.56(2) (West 2004).
86. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 218.
87. Id. at 220.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 221. This decision was rendered in an unpublished memorandum opinion on
March 1, 2002. Id. at 221 n.15.
90. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 221.
91. Id. The Court was only informed of the subsequent adoption after requesting updated
findings of fact from the trial court in August, 2002. Id. at 220 n.16.
92. Id. at 224. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.56(2) (West 2004).
93. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 225 n.25. The court explained that the adoption was labeled “at
risk” because the county understood there was a risk that the court could vacate the termination of
parental rights, thereby invalidating the adoption. Id.
94. Id. at 222-23 (explaining that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding that
there was either a lack of bond and attachment between Mother and child or a lack in Mother’s
ability to provide proper care and custody of her child).
95. Id. at 225.
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the supreme court’s power to review decisions.96 Although the supreme court
felt the statute prohibiting such adoptions was clear, they clarified it by stating
that “[i]n order to prevent this situation from recurring, we hold that trial courts
are not permitted to allow an adoption of a child whose parent’s rights have
been terminated while the parent’s appeal of that termination is pending in
either the court of appeals or this [Supreme] Court.”97 Therefore, the supreme
court reversed the decision terminating Mother’s parental rights and vacated
the order of adoption as invalid.98
C. State ex. rel. T.W. v. Ohmer99
In the spring of 2004, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled on a situation
mirroring those that the courts in both Illinois and Michigan faced.100 In State
ex. rel. T.W. v. The Honorable Steven R. Ohmer, Judge, Mother’s twin
daughters, KAW and KAW, were taken into custody by the State of Missouri
after two failed attempts to place them, with Mother’s consent, into adoptive
homes.101 Before her twins were born, Mother decided that she would
voluntarily place her children for adoption in order to “give them a better
life.”102 The twins were born premature, and throughout their two-month
hospital stay, Mother visited her children and cared for them.103 After finding
two adoptive families, both of whom were deemed unfit,104 Mother decided
she was capable of raising her children herself, and took strides to meet the
goals set by the trial court to regain custody of her children.105 Despite her
efforts, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights in December of
2002.106 Mother then appealed the trial court’s judgment, but while the appeal
was pending the trial court proceeded with the adoption of KAW and KAW to
their foster parents in April of 2003.107
Concurrently ruling in a separate opinion that the state did not have
sufficient evidence to legally terminate mother’s parental rights,108 the
96. Id.
97. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 226 (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. 133 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 2004).
100. Id.
101. In the Interest of K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. 2004).
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id.
104. Mother regarded the first adoptive family unfit after visiting them and learning that they
did not wish to retain contact with her after the adoption. Id. British adoption officials deemed
the second prospective adoptive family unfit. Id.
105. In the Interest of K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d, at 7.
106. Id. at 8.
107. State ex rel. T.W. v. Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d at 41, 42 (Mo. 2004).
108. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 21 (stating that “Mother’s parental rights were terminated
because of little more than her efforts to find an adoptive family for her twins”). The Supreme
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Missouri Supreme Court granted mother a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the
trial court judge from taking any further action consistent with an adoption,
and ordered the trial judge to set aside the decree of adoption.109 Although
Missouri juvenile law does not specifically provide for automatic stays of
adoption proceedings upon an appeal of an order terminating a parent’s
rights,110 the supreme court ruled that “[i]t is an abuse of discretion and a
circuit court lacks the power to proceed with adoption of a child who has been
the subject of a termination of parental rights while an appeal of the judgment
terminating parental rights is pending.”111 The Missouri Supreme Court, like
the Michigan Supreme Court also noted that “[p]roceeding with adoption while
the termination is reviewed on appeal compromises the parent’s right to
appellate review by requiring, as an effective precondition to reversal of the
termination, that the appellate court be prepared to address a separate adoption
proceeding.”112 Although the Missouri statutes were ambiguous as to whether
stays should be automatic pending appeals in termination cases,113 the Missouri
Supreme Court construed the statute as requiring automatic stays of the
underlying termination judgment and any subsequent adoptions pending
appeal.114
V. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
The above cases demonstrate the problem that occurs when children are
adopted while the underlying judgment terminating parental rights is
undergoing appellate review. If the underlying termination judgment is
reversed after an appeal has taken place, the result can be devastating, not only
to the relationship existing between the biological parent and child, but also to
the relationship being created between the adoptive parents and the child.
Although the courts in Missouri and Michigan ultimately rendered a decision
seemingly consistent with due process and the right to appeal, each court
expressed frustration and great concern over the effects of overturning the

Court stated that 1) Mother’s placement of her children for adoption did not constitute emotional
abuse, 2) Mother’s feelings of being overwhelmed were normal for a mother of five on welfare
and did not constitute abuse or a mental impairment, 3) the trial court’s finding that Mother’s
children suffered from attachment disorder was not supported by clear and cogent and convincing
evidence, 4) the trial court’s findings of lack of familial support for Mother were not supported by
clear and cogent and convincing evidence and 5) the trial courts findings of a lack of emotional
ties between Mother and the children was not supported by clear and cogent and convincing
evidence. Id. at 12-16.
109. State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d at 43.
110. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.011 (West 2004).
111. State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d at 43.
112. Id.
113. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.011 (West 2004).
114. State ex. rel T.W., 133 S.W.3d at 43.
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termination of parental rights after a subsequent adoption has been finalized.115
On the other hand, there is also great concern over the lack of remedy available
under state statutes that do not provide for automatic stays.116 Although there
is no easy answer,117 it is clear that a significant problem exists in the outcome
of the Illinois case. Such outcome should prompt state judges and legislators
nationwide to be proactive in their advocacy by examining their own state
statutes and advocating for change if their statutes do not provide for automatic
stays, just as the Illinois legislature did after realizing the error of their own
decision.
A.

Constitutional Concerns

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution “provides
heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests” that are rooted in United States history
and traditions and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.118 It has been long
established and accepted by the Supreme Court that natural parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the “care, custody and management of their
child.”119 This fundamental liberty interest is protected by the Fourteenth
115. See Id.; In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 225. See also In the Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d at
275 (stating that after a termination proceeding an order of adoption shall not be entered until it is
clear that the adoption will not be affected by an appeal, as reversing an order terminating
parental rights after a subsequent adoption could cause serious consequences); In the Interest of
Baby Boy N, 874 P.2d 680, 691 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that “setting aside an adoption
decree is an extreme decision and is fraught with possible consequences”).
116. See In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 312 (stating that there is a “compelling need for
structured reform in this area”). See also Jean Ann Kobinski v. The State of Nevada, Welfare
Division, 738 P.2d 895, 898 (Nev. 1987) (stating that “[a]lthough our statutes do not expressly
preclude the finalization of an adoption under these circumstances, the possibility of future
trauma to the child implicates public policy and justifies refusal to enter an adoption decree . . .”).
117. See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 225 (stating that “[t]here is no outcome that will avoid the
imposition of suffering upon either the birth parent of this child or his present adoptive parents”).
118. Washington v. Gluxberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
119. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (stating that freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651-52 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The
principal that parents have a fundamentally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of
their children is also widely accepted by states. E.g., G.W.B. v. J.S.W., So. 2d 961, 966-67 (Fla.
1995); In the Interest of Doe, 57 P.3d 447, 458 (Haw. 2001); Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37, 40
(Ark. 1979); State v. Renetta D., 571 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Neb. 1997); Jason S. V. Vally Hosp.
Med. Ctr., 87 P.3d 521, 527 (Nev. 2004); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 288 (N.D. 1999); In re
Murray, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ohio 1990); Greenville County Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Bowes,
437 S.E.2d 107, 110-11 (S.C. 1993); In the Matter of S.H., 337 N.W.2d 179, 181 (S.D. 1983);
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause,120 and includes the rights of parents to
establish a home, raise their children and control their children’s education, as
well as to nurture their children and control their destiny.121 The right of a
parent to raise their children is, in fact, one of the oldest fundamental liberty
interests that has been recognized by the Supreme Court.122 In addition, the
Court has stated that the fundamental liberty interest existing between parent
and child “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.”123
In noting this, the Supreme Court has held that the fundamental liberty
interest held by parents is not lost when parents lose custody to the state or are
not “model parents.”124 Although the relationship between the parent and child
may be strained, both parents and children continue to retain a vital interest in
preventing the destruction of the parent-child relationship.125 The Court has
acknowledged that a termination proceeding interferes with the parent’s
fundamental liberty interest and therefore held that when a state attempts to
destroy familial bonds, the state must provide for fundamentally fair
procedures.126 In holding, the Court stated:
The fact that the important liberty interests of the child and its foster parents
may also be affected by a permanent neglect proceeding does not justify
denying the natural parents constitutionally adequate procedures. Nor can the
State refuse to provide natural parents adequate procedural safeguards on the
ground that the family unit already has broken down; that is the very issue the
permanent neglect proceeding is meant to decide.127

In response, the Supreme Court requires that “state intervention to terminate
the relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by
procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.”128 In addition,
the Court mandates that in order to terminate parental rights, the state must
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993); In the Matter of the Termination of Parental
Rights to T.R.M., 303 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Wis. 1981).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).
122. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). In stating the monumental importance of
terminating parental rights, the Supreme Court has stated that the right to raise children is
“‘essential’” and one of the “‘basic civil rights of man’” that is “‘far more precious . . . than
property rights.’” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).
123. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
124. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 753-54. The Supreme Court explained that “[i]f anything, persons faced with the
forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections
than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.” Id (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 754 n.7 (emphasis in original).
128. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”129 Further,
in understanding the importance and finality of any decision to terminate
parental rights,130 but recognizing that the family is not beyond regulation, the
Supreme Court has noted that any decision infringing on a parent’s
fundamental liberty interest will be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.131
The Supreme Court has previously explained that the meaning of due
process under the United States Constitution is the “‘right to be heard before
being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not
involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic
to our society.’”132 In addition, the Court stated that “[t]he fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.’”133 Although the Court recognized that the
requirements of due process are flexible and should be tailored to each
individual situation, the Court suggested guidelines to analyze the interests at
stake and resolve questions that may arise.134 Specifically, the Court explained
that, in order to determine whether a state has impeded on a fundamental
liberty interest and therefore violated the requirements of the Due Process
Clause, courts should consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.135

Turning to the constitutional concerns related to the problem at hand, the
question of whether adoptions pending the appeal of the termination of
parental rights violates due process has not, to date, been brought before the
United States Supreme Court.136 However, in recent years, the Court has
decided other cases regarding the fundamental liberty interest of the parent-

129. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48.
130. The proceeding to terminate parental rights has been characterized by the Supreme Court
of Nevada as “tantamount to the imposition of a civil death penalty.” In the Matter of Parental
Rights as to J.L.N., 55 P.3d 955, 958 (Nev. 1955).
131. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
132. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
133. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
134. Id. at 334.
135. Id. at 335.
136. In March of 2003, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari to review
the decision 2001 of In re Tekela. Wanda Cooper v. Illinois, 538 U.S. 915 (2003).
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child relationship.137 These cases suggest that under strict scrutiny of the
Court, a state statute that impedes the parent-child relationship and the
underlying liberty interest will be deemed to violate due process if it does not
serve a compelling governmental interest.138
In looking at subsequent adoptions finalized after a parent has appealed the
underlying termination proceeding, a strong argument can be made that, by not
providing for and allowing automatic stays of adoption proceedings when
notice of appeal of underlying termination of parental rights has been given,
the state is violating the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
In the case of In re Tekela, although the Illinois Supreme Court determined
that clear and convincing evidence did not exist and Mother’s rights should not
have been terminated, Mother’s liberty interest in her children was
nevertheless destroyed due to the premature adoption of her children.139 This
violates the explicit holding of the Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer
which stated that a parent’s rights should not be terminated unless clear and
convincing evidence is shown to support destroying the liberty interest
embedded in the parent-child relationship.140 When parents are prevented from
reuniting with their children, not by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence of parental unfitness, but by the premature adoption of their children
during the appellate process, their constitutionally protected liberty interest has
been destroyed through an unconstitutional procedure.
In addition, in comparing the risk of erroneous decisions with the private
interests when the state proceeds with subsequent adoptions while parents
appeal the judgment terminating their parental rights, the Eldridge factors skew
to such action being a violation of the Due Process Clause. In such a situation,
there are many private interests at stake. In weighing the factors, one must
take into consideration the interest of the government, and each party
involved.141 Here, as in any conflict involved in the termination of parental
rights and adoption, there are many conflicting interests between the natural
parents, the child and the state.
As discussed above, as long as the natural parent is able to supply the child
with a safe and secure environment, the natural parents have a long accepted

137. E.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
138. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124-28 (holding that Mississippi precedent, which did not allow
M.L.B. to appeal the termination of her parental rights in forma pauperis, violated the due
process clause); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73-75 (holding that a Washington statute, which allowed any
person to petition for visitation and authorized the state courts to grant visitation whenever it may
serve the child best interests, was unconstitutional, as it infringed on a parent’s fundamental right
to rear her children without showing through clear and convincing evidence that the visitation
was to prevent harm to the child).
139. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 312-13.
140. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48.
141. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334 .
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interest in the care and custody of their child and in the preservation of the
parent-child relationship.142 In addition, the natural parents have an interest in
obtaining an accurate and just decision regarding their parental rights.143 If the
child is adopted before a parent has finished his (or her) appeal, both of these
interests have been prematurely destroyed.
Similar to the interests of the natural parent, the child also has an interest in
maintaining a parent-child relationship and building bonds with his (or her)
natural parent.144 In addition, the child has an interest in residing in a safe and
stable home environment that is permanent and secure.145 Only when the court
finds that the natural parent cannot provide a safe and secure home does the
child’s interest lie in residing without the natural parent.146 However, as long
as the natural parent’s home is safe and the parent is not deemed unfit, the
child has a strong interest in remaining with the natural parent.147
In contrast, the state has a plethora of interests that must be reviewed and
weighed against the interest of the parent and child. First, like the natural
parents, the state has an interest in obtaining an accurate and just determination
of the parent’s fitness.148 In addition, the state also has an administrative
interest in reducing the financial cost and burden of the proceedings and
services required to terminate parental rights.149 Finally, states have a
compelling interest in protecting the children who reside in their state from
harm.150 Through the state’s parens patrae power, states have an urgent
interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the children in their state.151
To do this, the state must identify parents who pose a risk to children and
proceed with terminating the rights of the parent if reasonable efforts do not
lead to a remedy of the dangerous or harmful situation. However, if there is
reason to believe that a positive and nurturing relationship can exist between
the natural parent and child, it is well accepted that the state’s interest favors
preserving and not severing the natural familial bonds.152
142. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
143. Id. at 765 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
144. Id. at 761.
145. Id. at 788-98 (Rhenquist, J. dissenting) (explaining that a safe, stable and loving
homelife is essential to a child’s physical emotional and spiritual well being).
146. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761.
147. Id.at 760.
148. Id. at 766 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
149. Id. at 766. It is estimated that in fiscal year 2000 total spending for out-of-home care,
including federal, state and local funding, was at least 9.1 billion dollars. United States
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Foster
Care National Statistics, at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/foster.cfm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2005).
150. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 767. See also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (explaining that there is “no gain towards
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Next, Eldridge requires an analysis of whether, by allowing for subsequent
adoptions while a parent appeals the underlying judgment terminating their
parental rights, there is an increased risk of erroneous decisions.153 As the
decision of In re Tekela demonstrates, such erroneous decisions are possible
and have occurred.154 Appealing a judgment can be a lengthy process in the
United States, while adoption, in many cases, occurs quickly.155 If a parent
fails to meet a state’s requirements for a stay, or a judge ruling on a motion to
stay denies the motion, the effects can be devastating. The adoption could be
final and unappealable long before a parent or the trial judge receives the final
ruling from the appellate court on the necessary termination. If the termination
is reversed, the parent is left stripped of his or her child and the relationship
that is considered “fundamental” without a finding of unfitness. As case law
has shown, the risk being discussed has occurred due to the absence of
automatic stays.156 In contrast, such a risk of erroneous outcomes can be
greatly reduced by requiring states to automatically stay judgments to
terminate parental rights upon notice of an appeal.
In light of the above factors, it is apparent that the states’ interest in
reducing the cost of terminating parental rights is comparatively slight
compared to the risk that erroneous decisions can occur that would strip the
natural parent of their fundamental and constitutionally protected interest in a
relationship with their children. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that a
state that does not require the automatic stay of adoption proceedings, but
instead allows adoptions to proceed before a final decision is rendered, is in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
B.

Policy Concerns

Notwithstanding the constitutional concerns discussed above, there are also
strong policy arguments that courts and state legislators should examine when
either determining whether a change should be made to their state’s current
appellate procedure or interpreting ambiguous language in their current
statutory rules.
First, by not providing for automatic stays of adoptions pending appeal, the
integrity of the judicial system is strongly diminished.157 If the appellate court
finds that a parent’s rights have been wrongly terminated, courts are forced to
[the state’s] declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. . .the State
spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates [a child] from his family”).
153. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
154. See In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 304.
155. Id. at 312.
156. See e.g., In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 304; State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d 41. See also In
the Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d 273; In the Interest of Baby Boy N, 874 P.2d 680; Jean Ann
Kobinski, 738 P.2d 895.
157. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 225.
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make a choice between taking a child away from the safe and stable home of
an adoptive parent where the child has found permanence, or alternatively,
severing the relationship between the natural parent and child without a finding
of unfitness and leaving the natural parent whose rights have been wrongly
terminated without a remedy.158 Likewise, if stays are not automatic, but are
instead allowed at the discretion of the trial judge, the granting of appeals
could be allowed or disallowed according to one judge’s bias or whim and
stays may not be uniformly granted.159 This choice distorts the nature of
appellate review and leaves a black cloud on the granting of relief.160
Similarly, such a dilemma leaves open the risk that states could be tempted
to delay the adjudication leading to the judgment terminating parental rights in
order to find a suitable adoptive family and subsequently race to an order of
adoption as soon as possible after such judgment is rendered.161 This risk
exists when having a decree of adoption would effectively moot any challenge
to the judgment terminating parental rights, as once an adoption is final parents
will be left without a remedy whether they succeed on appeal or not.162
Finally, and arguably most importantly, allowing adoptions before the
appeal is final leaves all of the parties involved, including the child and the
adoptive parents in a situation with no finality or stability.163 In Michigan, the
trial court allowed the adoption in In re JK to take place pending appeal and
termed the adoption an “at risk” adoption.164 The court recognized the chance
that the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights might be declared
erroneous but nonetheless placed the child for adoption.165 In In re JK, the
Michigan Supreme Court reprimanded the trial court for granting the “at risk”
adoption and explained that such adoptions will have a “significant effect on
the lives of everyone connected with this case.”166 Allowing an adoption,
knowing that the bond and relationship the adoptive parent forms with the
child could ultimately be torn apart, can have a traumatic psychological effect
158. Id.
159. See In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 315 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (stating that such a system
“places a parent’s fundamental rights wholly at the mercy of a judge’s subjective view of what is
fair”).
160. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 217.
161. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 315 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
162. See id.
163. See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 225 (expressing concern over the necessity of removing
the child from the adoptive parents in order to “give faithful effect to the law”); Jean Ann
Kobinski, 738 P.2d at 898 (expressing concern over the “possibility of future trauma to the
child”); In the Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d at 275 (explaining that, had the court been required to
reverse the termination of parental rights, it would have serious effects on the children, adoptive
parents and natural parents).
164. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 225 n.25.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 225.
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on all parties involved, especially the child.167 Furthermore, even if the trial
court does not deem the adoption to be “at risk” of reversal, a proceeding
terminating parental rights is always “subject to careful scrutiny on appeal and
reversal is always a possibility.”168 Therefore, finalizing the adoption of
children, in any case, before an appeal of the underlying termination has been
adjudicated always carries the grave risk that the stability and finality given to
the child will have to be destroyed in order to give faithful effect to the law.
The above policy concerns, which have been stated by courts when
determining whether stays of the adoption should have been given upon notice
of appeal, point to the conclusion that the “status quo” should be preserved
pending appeal by providing for automatic stays of subsequent adoption
proceedings and the underlying judgment terminating parental rights.
C. Proposed Solution
In response to the concerns raised above, a proposed model statute is laid
out below. This statute does not alter statutory provisions that allow states to
protect their interest in terminating the rights of parents who are deemed unfit
through clear and convincing evidence. Instead, the model statute is a proposal
to protect the constitutional rights of parents whose parental rights have been
wrongly terminated by providing for the automatic stay of adoption
proceedings pending a final decision on appeal. In addition, the model statute
provides for a strict expedited timeline for the appellate process in order to
comply with the mandate set by ASFA and to protect children from
languishing in the foster care system during a lengthy appellate process.
Proposed Model Statute—Appeals, Termination of Parental Rights169
Section 1: Legislative Findings
1. Natural parents have a interest in both maintaining a relationship with
their child unless deemed by the court to be unfit and in appealing any
wrongful termination of their parental rights.
2. The State has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent
homes for children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of

167. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788-89 (Rhenquist, J. dissenting) (stating that “a stable, loving
homelife is essential to a child’s physical, emotional and spiritual wellbeing”). See also MARY
ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE LEGAL BATTLE, AND
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 98 (2000) (stating that children who lose a parent have an increased
risk of emotional and social dysfunction in adulthood).
168. Kobinski, 738 P.2d at 898.
169. Portions of this model statute were compiled by examining statutes in various states. See
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.146; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2407 (1994); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 710.56(2) (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. 453.011 (West 2003).
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adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting
the needs of children.
3. Adoptive children have the right to permanence and stability in their
adoptive placement.
4. Adoptive parents have a constitutional interest in retaining custody of a
legally adopted child.
Section 2: Legislative Purpose
1. To provide procedures to insure children, parents, guardians and other
interested parties the constitutionally protected right to due process by
assuring hearings by an impartial court with recognition and
enforcement of all parties’ constitutional rights, while insuring that
public safety as well as the interests of the integrity of the court and the
state government are simultaneously protected.
2. To encourage timely and permanent placements for children with
families suitable to meet their individual needs.
3. To provide for the safety, care and protection of children and to ensure
and promote the health and well-being of all children in the state’s care.
Section 3: Definitions
1. “Adoption” Creating a legal relationship between a parent and child
where it did not already exist. Declaring the child to legally be the
child of the adoptive parents and entitled to all the rights, and
privileges, and subject to all obligations of a child born to such adoptive
parents.
2. “Child” Any person under the age of eighteen who has not been
emancipated.
3. “Child Placement Agency” Any person, society, association or
institution licensed by the Department of Child and Family Services to
care for, receive, or board children and to place children in a licensed
child caring institution or a foster or adoptive home.
4. “Court” The state supreme court, the court of appeals, and the circuit
court in exercise of jurisdiction described by state statute.
5. “Order” A decision, order, judgment, decree or rule of a lower tribunal,
excluding minutes and minute book entries.
6. “Parent” A woman who gave birth to a child, the putative father of the
child and the husband of the woman who gave birth to the child at the
time the child was conceived. If a child has been legally adopted, the
term “parent” also includes the adoptive mother and father of the child.
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Section 4: Appellate Procedure—Termination of Parental Rights
1. An appeal from an order terminating parental rights must be taken
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the order by the appellant in
court, thirty-five (35) days from the mailing of the order to appellant by
the clerk of the court, or thirty (30) days after service by a party or law
guardian of the appellant.
2. The record shall be filed by the circuit court within thirty (30) days
after notice of the appeal is filed in the circuit court.
3. Appellant’s brief must be filed within thirty (30) days of the filing of
the record on appeal.
4. Respondent’s brief must be filed within thirty (30) days of the filing of
appellant’s brief.
5. Any reply brief must be filed within ten (10) days of the filing of
respondent’s brief.
6. In no event shall the court permit more than one request for an
extension by either party.
7. The court shall give priority over other civil litigation to appeals filed
under this rule in reaching a determination on the status of the
termination of parental rights by entering scheduling orders to ensure
that a ruling will be entered within thirty (30) days of the close of oral
arguments.
Section 5: Effect of Appeal—Stays of Proceedings
1. A termination of parental rights order, with placement of the child with
a licensed child placement agency or the Department of Child and
Family Services for subsequent adoption, shall automatically be
suspended upon timely notice of appeal to the trial court while the
appeal is pending.
2. No bond will be required with respect to a stay pending appeal of the
termination of parental rights.
3. During the appeal, the child shall continue in the custody of the
Division of Child and Family Services or other child placement agency
under the order until the appeal is decided. The Division of Child and
Family Services or other child placement agency, through the
jurisdiction of the trial court, will continue to have the authority to
make decisions regarding the care, custody and support of the child.
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4. The automatic stay under this rule shall stay the power to enter an order
of adoption without the parents consent as well as the power of any
person or agency to consent to an adoption for the parent.
D. Arguments In Support of Proposed Model Statute
The above legislation is not intended to decrease the rights of states to
terminate the parental rights of unfit parents when termination is in the best
interest of the child. Nor should the legislation be interpreted as obscuring the
rights of states to proceed with adoptions after termination has occurred.
When a parent is unfit, both termination and adoption are essential to realize
the child’s right to a safe, permanent and stable home environment. Instead,
the above legislation is intended to enable parents to realize their protected
right to appeal a judgment wrongfully entered against them. The proposed
statute is intended to bring balance back into the legal system that seems to
have been lost in the states’ quest to comply with the ASFA and promote
speedier adoptions. The proposed legislation allows states to remain in
compliance with the ASFA mandates, while simultaneously satisfying any
constitutional and policy concerns that arise under a system that allows for
adoptions pending the outcome of a rightful appeal.
1. Compliance with the Adoption and Safe Families Act
Although the proposed legislation could slow down the timing of
adoptions in cases where a parent appeals the termination judgment, the
proposal still allows and encourages states to maintain compliance with the
requirements of the ASFA. The ASFA requires states to make reasonable
efforts for reunification for 12 months after the child enters the custody of the
state.170 In addition, the ASFA requires states to petition for the termination of
parental rights after the child has been in care for 15 out of the most recent 22
months.171 Further, the ASFA requires states to “identify, recruit, process, and
approve a qualified family for adoption.”172 Because the above legislation
does not alter the state’s right to terminate parental rights, and does not attempt
to modify the state’s procedure during the underlying termination proceedings,
states that enact legislation like that proposed will not fall out of compliance
with the ASFA.
In addition, while a parent is appealing the termination of their parental
rights and a stay is in effect, the legislation provides that the stay will not
change the states’ jurisdiction over the care, custody and support of the child.

170. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101(a)(15)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(15)(B)(ii).
171. Id. § 103(a)(3)(E); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
172. Id.
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This gives states the right to move children into pre-adoptive homes and
monitor their progress while the appeal is proceeding. The only power lost to
states is the power to finalize such adoptions until the appeal is completed.
Further, because the legislation promotes expediting the appellate process in
termination of parental rights cases, children will not languish in the foster care
system, as required by the ASFA. Although staying adoption proceedings
while an appeal is proceeding will slow the adoption process, states will not be
allowing children to languish, as they will be diligently attempting to resolve
the situation through an expedited appellate process.
2. Putting Constitutional Concerns to Rest
In addition to allowing states to remain in compliance with the ASFA, the
proposed legislation lays to rest any constitutional concerns that may arise
when states does not provide for automatic stays and instead allow for the
subsequent adoption of children before an appeal has concluded. This
legislation satisfies the interests of all parties, including the parent, the child
and the state.
The interest of the child in residing in a safe, permanent and stable home
environment173 is satisfied, as the child can be placed in a safe home while the
appeal is pending and will not be returned to a dangerous environment. In
addition, the state has the authority to place the child in a pre-adoptive home
during the appeal to make the transition to adoption easier if the underlying
termination is upheld. Further, the child will not be left to languish in multiple
foster homes during a lengthy appellate process, as the process has been
expedited to allow for a faster resolution of the case.
In addition, the interest of both the parent and the state to gain an accurate
and just decision regarding their parental rights is satisfied.174 The parent is
able to appeal the judgment without fear that their children will be adopted in
the process, leaving them without a remedy if the judgment is reversed.
Similarly, although the state will have to maintain support of the child during
the appeal, the court will simultaneously reduce the financial burden of
maintaining the care, custody and support of the child during the appeal by
expediting the time it will take to obtain a just, accurate and final decision on
appeal.
Likewise, providing for automatic stays pending appeal will substantially
lower the risk that an erroneous decision may occur during the proceedings.
By providing for automatic stays, the risk that a parent would be denied a stay
or would not meet the requirements of the stay is greatly reduced. In effect,
there is a reduced chance that a finalized adoption will occur during the appeal,
which greatly decreases the risk that an erroneous decision will be rendered or
173. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788-89 (Rhenquist, J. dissenting).
174. Id. at 766.
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that parents will be left without a remedy if the judgment terminating parental
rights is overturned. Although there is still a chance that judges will
erroneously disregard the mandate and proceed with an adoption during the
appeal despite statutory language that clearly provides otherwise,175 if such an
adoption would occur, the judiciary has a clear way of examining the problem
and determining the rightful solution. As a result, states are able to maintain
the right of parents to appeal judgments and are providing for fundamentally
fair procedures when terminating a parent’s protected right to their children, as
required by the Supreme Court.176 Such a proposal should withstand the strict
judicial scrutiny that is applied to procedures that terminate a parent’s
fundamentally protected right.
3. Grounded in Policy
In addition to maintaining compliance with the ASFA and satisfying any
constitutional concerns, the proposed legislation is also supported by policy.
First, automatic stays of the judgment terminating parental rights and any
subsequent adoption upon notice of appeal maintains the integrity of the
judicial system that is arguably lost when such stays do not take place.177 As
long as courts comply with the statutory mandate to automatically stay
subsequent adoption proceedings, courts will no longer be forced to make the
difficult decision of taking away the rights of the adoptive parent or
alternatively leaving the natural parent without the remedy afforded to them.178
Instead, appellate courts can focus only on the issue brought before them:
whether the trial court rightfully terminated the rights of the natural parents.
Similarly, by providing for stays of adoptions until an appeal is complete,
the adoptive parent will not have to endure the emotional upheaval of having
an adopted child removed from their home. Once a court finalizes an adoption,
the adoptive parent has an interest in bonding and maintaining a relationship
with the child by providing for them both physically and emotionally. By
providing for automatic stays and not allowing premature or “at risk”
adoptions to take place, not only are appellate courts relieved of making a
decision between an adoptive parent and a natural parent, but the adoptive
parent is also relieved of the turmoil and emotional effect that such a decision
is bond to have.179 It has been noted that if adoptive parents feel they are “at
risk” of losing the adopted child, they are less likely to make an effort to bond

175. See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216.
176. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177. See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d. at 225.
178. Id.
179. See In the Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d at 275 (explaining that, had the court been
required to reverse the termination of parental rights, it would have serious effects on the
children, adoptive parents and natural parents).
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emotionally with the child.180 Under the proposed legislation, the child can be
placed in the home of the prospective adoptive parent, but the legal ties will
not be made until after a decision on appeal is rendered. This legislation
ensures that any legal and emotional bonds made between the adoptive parent
and child after the adoption occurs cannot and will not be torn apart, and
therefore logically promotes the creation of such bonds.
In addition, if a system with automatic stays during appeals is
implemented, children are ultimately afforded more stability and permanence
in their adoptive placements. Allowing for adoptions, even those deemed “at
risk” of reversal, does not provide the child with permanency and stability.
Instead, such a system provides the child with the risk of yet another
detrimental upheaval. Studies have shown that a child who loses a parent,
whether through death or a legal process, has an increased risk of emotional
and social problems in adulthood.181 If the child’s relationship “is interrupted
more than once, as happens with multiple foster placements in the early years,
the children’s emotional attachments become increasingly shallow and
indiscriminate.”182 If adoption proceedings are stayed during the appellate
process, an order of adoption will have more impact and will be more likely to
induce the feeling of finality and stability that is much needed in the life of any
child who has been removed from his/her home.
Finally, when the appellate process is expedited, children will not be
forced to languish in the foster care system or in pre-adoptive homes while
waiting for what could be a lengthy appellate process to proceed. Although
this Comment promotes stays of adoption, it does not promote children
suffering in the foster care system for excessive amounts of time, as “even in a
loving, long term foster home, the uncertainty of the foster care status may
cause hardship.” Instead, the proposed statute promotes an expedited appellate
process, which will lessen the risk of excessive foster care. This allows
adoptive parents and children to form much needed attachments and bonds to
each other as soon as possible183 while still allowing natural parents the right to
appeal any judgment against them.

180. See Jessica K. Heldman, Comment, Court Delay and the Waiting Child, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV 1001, 1010 n.60 (stating that adoptive parents may be anxious or tentative in developing
bonds with the child).
181. MASON, supra note 167, at 98.
182. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 19 (1996).
183. “A child’s attachment to the parent and the parent’s attachment to the child are
considered factors that protect against delinquency.” Heldman, supra note 180, at 1011 n.69
(2003) (citing Sharon G. Elstein, Understanding the Relationship between Maltreatment and
Delinquency, 18 CHILD L. PRAC. 136, 139 (1999)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As stated, the ASFA was one of the most significant pieces of child
welfare legislation in United States history. It promoted the idea that, while
states should make reasonable efforts to reunify families after removing
children from the homes of their parents, significant efforts should be made to
stop children from languishing in the foster care system and to promote
adoption after the termination of parental rights. Using the ASFA mandates as
guidance, states enacted statutes to comply with the federal legislation, but
arguably swung too far in their quest to finalize a greater number of adoptions
at the expense of the parents’ right to appeal.
As the cases of In re Tekela, In re J.K. and State ex rel. T.W. v. The
Honorable Steven R. Ohmer, Judge indicate, there are major implications when
states choose not to automatically stay adoption proceedings while parents
pursue their appellate rights and choose instead to finalize adoptions before the
outcome of the appeal is known. Both constitutional and policy-based
concerns exist regarding such procedures. If the appellate court ultimately
decides that the parent’s rights were unlawfully terminated, the state is faced
with having to “unscramble the proverbial egg” by overturning the subsequent
adoption or leaving the parents without a remedy.
The proposed statutory changes promoted in this Comment are not
intended to reward negligent and unfit parents, but are intended to preserve the
rights of parents whose rights have been wrongly terminated. Although it is
clear that no simple or perfect solution exists, and a compromise is necessary,
the proposed legislation protects the union between the child and natural parent
as well as the appellate rights of the natural parent while simultaneously
promoting the purpose of the ASFA to reduce the number of children
languishing in foster care and to promote adoption. It is extremely important
for states to promote the safety and security of children; however, states must
still ensure that the appellate rights of parents are maintained to ensure a
remedy if the “system” breaks down and parental rights are wrongly
terminated.
In conclusion, it is not merely the responsibility of the legislature but also
the judicial branch to promote change. While it is imperative to sever the
rights of unfit parents and to promote stability for children, it is also extremely
important that states maintain the rights of parents during the quest for
stability. In order to maintain the rights of the state, the child and the parents, a
partnership must be forged between the judicial branch and the legislature to
examine the procedures currently used during an appeal from the termination
of parental rights and promote changes to automatically stay subsequent
adoption proceedings and expedite the appellate process. States should not
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idly sit waiting for a problem to arise under current procedural guidelines that
do not provide for stays, but should instead be proactive in their advocacy.
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